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Historically, the influence of American pragmatism on archaeology and archaeological theory 
has been limited. Until recently, archaeologists have shown little interest in pragmatism 
(Preucel & Mrozowski 2010). In what follows we will provide a plausible explanation for 
this omission and, more importantly, an outline of why and how the lacuna can be filled. 
Whilst this chapter centres mainly around classical pragmatism, in particular G.H. Mead’s 
(1863-1931) work, we would like to begin with a few words on the significance of neo-
pragmatism for archaeology.  
As we have discussed elsewhere, there are significant affinities between neo-pragmatism and 
recent developments in archaeology. Neo-pragmatist philosophy of social science distances 
itself from any attempt to search for the universal foundations or essence of science on the 
grounds that empirical research into the practice of both the natural and social sciences shows 
a remarkable methodological heterogeneity within each academic discipline (Baert 2005; 
Baert & Silva 2010). Any attempt to establish the purported nature of scientific activity risks 
being either at odds with successful existing research, or so general as to prove unfruitful. 
Rather than providing an elusive ‘scientific’ yardstick to judge existing social research, neo-
pragmatism promotes research aimed at self-referential knowledge acquisition, that is 
enabling reflection, on the presuppositions that underpin the research. This type of research is 
compatible with some of the concerns of post-processual archaeologists, reflecting as they do 
on how deep-seated assumptions have unwittingly been imposed on empirical material. 
Aware of the theory-laden nature of observations, both neo-pragmatist philosophers of social 
science, and post-processual archaeologists are unwilling, as if theories could be tested 
straightforwardly, to see research as an empirical court of arbitration. Instead, they treat 
empirical research as an opportunity to reflect on previously held presuppositions and to 
conceive of new theoretical and socio-political scenarios. Research is, then, judged not so 
much in terms of empirical corroboration, but in terms of how much it brings about this 
reflexivity. 
Yet, despite the commonalities between neo-pragmatism and post-processual archaeologies, 
the fact remains that the influence of pragmatist ideas on archaeology remains limited at best. 
In this chapter we propose an explanation for the lack of interest amongst archaeologists in 
pragmatism, and we show that archaeological theory can benefit from further engagement not 
simply with neo-pragmatism, but with classical pragmatism. We will focus particularly on the 
relevance of the work of G.H. Mead. 
 
The selective appropriation of Mead and pragmatism 
This section deals with mechanisms of diffusion and reception within the academy. Whereas 
most sociologists of intellectuals have been interested in mechanisms of successful diffusion 
(e.g. Lamont 1987, Baert 2011), we seek to provide an explanation as to why, within the 
discipline of archaeology, pragmatism has practically never been discussed,
1
 let alone 
adopted. Why have archaeologists until now paid so little attention to pragmatism? How can 
we explain this blind spot? 
There are two obvious explanations which we seek to reject. The first account would be that 
American pragmatism is of little use to the discipline of archaeology. This explanation is 
problematic because pragmatism has always been a broach church, and there are a variety of 
pragmatisms (e.g. Shook & Margolis 2009), some of which are in line with the concerns of 
archaeologists. We will show that a particular reading of Mead – quite different from the 
dominant one – can be very fruitful indeed.  A second possible explanation would be that 
other theoretical or philosophical orientations gained prominence in archaeology and have 
made it difficult for alternatives such as pragmatism to make an inroad. Important as the inner 
dynamics within archaeology may be, this explanation is limited, not least because 
archaeology and archaeological theory have, especially more recently, been receptive to a 
wide variety of theoretical perspectives (e.g. Johnson 2010). There is no methodological or 
theoretical consensus; and archaeologists have cultivated a broad interest. 
Rather than focusing on developments within archaeology and archaeological theory, we 
make a more counter-intuitive claim by looking at the history of the reception of pragmatism 
within the humanities and social sciences. More precisely, we will argue that certain 
sociologists and social theorists managed to impose a very particular, and in some respects 
distorted, version of classical pragmatism, that this specific reading became relatively 
dominant in the humanities and social sciences, and that it omitted aspects of pragmatism that 
would have been more appealing to the discipline of archaeology. Accordingly, we argue that 
a rereading of classical pragmatism can prove fruitful for archaeology. 
In the course of the twentieth century, social theory has become the main vehicle through 
which innovations or new perspectives are introduced in the humanities and social sciences, 
and travel from one discipline to another (Baert 2006). Since the 1980s, the discipline of 
archaeology has paid increasing attention to developments in social theory and sociology, and 
has incorporated a plethora of perspectives, ranging from structuration theory to genealogical 
history. Whilst pragmatism, and in particular Mead’s version of it, has developed a significant 
presence in social theory and sociology, archaeologists have shown little interest in it. We 
argue that the selective appropriation of pragmatism within social theory and sociology partly 
accounts for this omission. 
In the early decades of the twentieth century pragmatism reigned supreme in a number of key 
American philosophy departments (e.g. Gross 2007). Pragmatism flourished particularly in 
the newly formed University of Chicago where it developed into a unifying intellectual 
perspective not only in the philosophy department but also amongst sociologists. Of all the 
American pragmatists, the Chicago-based philosopher George Herbert Mead was particularly 
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sensitive to more sociological concerns and arguments (e.g. Joas 1993). Influenced by a long 
spell in Germany, he advocated a social concept of the self in which reflexivity is intertwined 
with the individual’s ability to take up the perspectives of other individuals and, indeed, of 
the whole community. Mead’s concept of the generalized other captures this commonality, 
referring as it does to a set of meanings and normative regulations that are shared by 
members of a similar community.  
After Mead’s death, Herbert Blumer, a former student, portrayed him as the precursor of his 
own proposal for a sociological research programme that was meant to provide an alternative 
to the growing hegemony of structural functionalism (Blumer [1969] 1986). This alternative 
research programme was ‘symbolic interactionism’, a term coined by Blumer himself in the 
1930s (Blumer 1937). Blumer always emphasized the American roots of this approach, from 
classical American philosophical pragmatism (Tucker 1988) to the Chicago-style sociology in 
which he had been educated. But more important to our present concerns is the pivotal role 
played by Blumer’s image of Mead in this narrative. Mead’s ideas, and especially Mead’s 
social psychology as presented in Mind, Self, and Society, were systematically presented as a 
crucial legitimating element of Blumer’s version of symbolic interactionism. Blumer quoted 
extensively from this book and presented it as the chief intellectual reference of the ‘Chicago 
school of sociology’. Besides signalling the beginning of Blumer’s long intellectual career, 
the biographical circumstance by which he saw himself as Mead’s ‘appointed successor’ had 
an important consequence for his reading of Mind, Self, and Society. The fact that this book 
had been assembled from notes from the very same course which made him Mead’s 
intellectual heir helps explain why Blumer never seriously addressed any of the many 
editorial issues that plague the book.
2
 Instead, he was more interested in controlling its 
interpretation, with the additional ambition of governing a certain tradition of scientific 
inquiry. In what surely is one of sociology’s greatest ironies, Blumer, the creator of one of 
sociology’s earliest and most accomplished social constructionist approaches, failed to 
adequately address the constructed nature of his view of the discipline’s past.  
Indeed, Blumer’s account of his early Chicago days, despite contributing greatly to Mead’s 
canonization, often amounted to little more than a self-serving mythology – a blind spot in his 
otherwise brilliant analysis that cost him greatly for it did not pass unnoticed by his critics 
(e.g. Mills 1942), all too aware of the rhetorical spin Blumer placed upon the construction of 
the disciplinary controversies he was involved in. These limitations came under attack in the 
1970s as a new generation of more historically-minded sociologists proposed a revised 
interpretation of Mead’s influence upon symbolic interactionism. Clark McPhail and Cynthia 
Rexroat, who emphasized that their arguments were based ‘primarily upon Mead’s articles’ 
rather than on ‘student lecture notes, e.g., 1934 [i.e. Mind, Self, and Society]’ (1979: 450), 
were among the first to move beyond Morris’s volume and to seriously question Blumer’s 
‘Mead’. In the wake of this historicist revival, subsequent decades would witness a complete 
revolution in Mead scholarship, with the publication of numerous articles and books offering 
rigorous historical reconstructions of Mead’s life and work (e.g. Joas, [1980] 1985). Partly 
due to path-dependency effects and partly due to the lack of an alternative collection of 
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Mead’s writings,3 however, this was not enough to displace Mind, Self, and Society as the 
chief source on which major commentators, such as Jürgen Habermas and Axel Honneth, 
relied to judge Mead’s views well into the 1980s and 1990s (Habermas [1981] 1984; Honneth 
[1992] 1996). Yet the longer Mind, Self, and Society has remained the key entry-point to 
Mead’s work, the longer it has taken to supersede the limited one-sided view of what he has 
to offer social sciences. 
From the point of view of archaeology, two features of this selective appropriation stand out. 
Firstly, by overplaying Mead’s commentary on face-to-face interaction between individuals, 
there is little attention to his elaborate reflections on physical objects. It is as if pragmatists 
only deal with people’s interactions but have remarkably little to say about the material 
artefacts which are so central to the work of a professional archaeologist. Secondly, by 
overemphasizing the significance of Mead’s work for dealing with social psychological 
issues, there is hardly any discussion of Mead’s broader evolutionary perspective. It is as if 
pragmatism is incompatible with a diachronic view and has little to offer a discipline like 
archaeology which covers longer temporal spans.  
Other omissions could be added, but these two features of the history of the reception and 
dissemination of Mead’s ideas provide particularly good illustrations of what we have in 
mind. Although Mead’s published writings offer unmistakable evidence as to the central 
place that both evolutionary theory and objects play in his thinking, the micro-sociological, 
interpretive reading suggested by symbolic interactionists has been so dominant that one is 
led to believe that such a reading encapsulates the core of Mead’s contributions to 
contemporary social theory. Our claim is that it does not. Mead has much else to offer besides 
his well-known theory of the self, including an elaborate theory of temporality (Baert 1992), 
a radical democratic theory of ethics and democratic deliberation (Silva 2007), and a 
thoroughly intersubjective model of action and rationality (Gillespie 2005). Both features 
give a misguided view of Mead and, indeed, of pragmatism. In what follows we will show 
that if we study closely other aspects of Mead’s corpus, we arrive at a more nuanced picture 
of his social theory, one which is more amenable to the concerns of archaeology. 
 
An alternative reading of Mead 
Supporting our alternative reading is a recent collection of Mead’s own writings (Mead 
2011), which we privilege over Mind, Self, and Society. The highlights of this alternative 
reading of Mead are his conception of agency, his theory of meaning, and the peculiar way in 
which he conceives of objects. But first let us briefly discuss the general traits of Mead’s 
thinking, which are often underplayed by those who rely on Mind, Self, and Society as the 
main entry-point to his work.  
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One of the most distinctive features of Mead’s social theory lies in its evolutionary outlook 
(e.g. Cook 1993). Living in an epoch when American academia was separating itself from the 
religious influence that had dominated it since its inception, Mead saw in Darwin’s natural 
selection theory the most accomplished scientific answer to the theological doctrine of the 
permanent species (e.g. Mead 2011, chap. 12).  Yet it must be emphasized that Mead never 
subscribed to social Darwinism, according to which social life is nothing more than the 
competitive struggle among the fittest. On the contrary, Mead’s regulatory ideal is that of 
social cooperation through symbolic means, with a particular preoccupation towards the least 
advantaged members of society (women, workers, and immigrants were amongst those 
groups Mead assisted through his numerous voluntary activities). Despite rejecting social 
Darwinism, Mead believed in social reconstruction just as he believed in scientific 
reconstruction.
4
 There was no insurmountable gap between theory and practice, between 
‘head and hand’ because, as Darwin had shown, mental operations were but embedded bodily 
functions of an organism trying to adapt to the surrounding environment. This is the cardinal 
principle, derived directly from Darwin, of Mead’s functionalist approach to social 
psychology. Hence it is as a pragmatist that Mead incorporates Darwinism into his system of 
thinking. This incorporation goes hand-in-hand with Mead’s interpretation of Hegel’s 
‘philosophy of evolution’ as a speculative precursor of Darwin’s theory of the origin of 
species. According to Mead, this is a particularly productive encounter insofar as it enabled 
philosophy to overcome the dichotomy between mechanistic and teleological theories of 
evolution (Silva 2007: 8). As Mead asserts in his 1909 address on the occasion of Darwin’s 
centenary, the: ‘statement of Hegel is from within the analysis of the process of reason. The 
statement of Darwin is from without the study of animal and vegetable nature (...).’ Mead 
then points out the insight to be drawn from the pragmatist synthesis of Hegel and Darwin: 
‘In a word, both recognized that the process of experience could create the form, or the type, 
or the species’ (2011: 120). Such an insight, as we shall see, would prove decisive for Mead's 
theory of objects. 
A second feature of Mead’s social psychology refers to its relation to behaviourism (e.g. 
Mead 2011, chaps. 2 and 7). Writing at a time when behaviourism was already the 
predominant orientation in American psychology, Mead had no choice but to inscribe his own 
proposals within that paradigm. Yet Mead’s social psychology is much more than a mere 
variation of John Watson’s orthodox behaviourism. There are at least four fundamental 
differences that distinguish Mead from Watson. First, Mead rejects the latter’s behaviourism 
in favour of a functional and naturalistic analysis of mental phenomena. Second, Mead is 
critical of Watson’s neglect of the internal field of the human act (Mead’s aim is to approach 
the ‘inner’ experience in a way no less objective than that proposed by Watsonian 
behaviourism). Third, the importance devoted to language in Mead’s social psychology has 
no parallel in Watson’s behaviourism. Fourth, contrary to Watson’s behaviourism, Mead 
rejects the dualism between body and psyche, the so-called psychological parallelism. 
Admittedly, this is not an original insight by Mead, as Hegel and then Dewey had already 
similarly suggested action should be interpreted as an organic whole. Mead brings a novel 
dimension to this organic or functionalist (as opposed to mechanicist) perspective when he 
suggests that the organic model of action can be reconciled with behaviourism to the extent to 
                                                 
4
 The theme of ‘intelligent social reconstruction’, far from exclusive to Mead, is in fact a classic pragmatist 
theme. For instance, John Dewey made it a centrepiece of his moral philosophy. See Dewey (1976).  
which both rule out introspectionism. As a result, Mead’s behaviourism is not a mere 
socially-minded variant of Watsonian behaviourism; rather, Mead’s behaviourism is to be 
conceived of as thoroughly social and intersubjective. 
The third characteristic of Mead’s social psychology refers to its scientific character (e.g. 
Silva 2008, chaps. 5-8). Mead believes that the social and human sciences deserve scientific 
status no less than do any other of the so-called natural or physical sciences. In the social and 
natural sciences alike, given the experimental and problem-solving nature of their activity, 
scientists are interested in particulars insofar as they emerge as exceptions to universals. 
Mead’s attempt at reconstructing the social origins and nature of human consciousness, which 
we discuss in further detail below, should thus be seen as the application of the principles of 
the scientific method to this particular problem. In the case of Mead’s ‘scientific social 
psychology’, the standpoint to be adopted should be one that lies at the intersection of all 
differing perspectives on the object so that it can disclose the self’s uniformities, which can 
serve as data for scientific experimentation while at the same time retaining their particular 
content. A similarly impartial, objective standpoint can be seen operating in other areas of 
Mead’s system of thinking, which suggests this scientific trait to be a constitutive feature of 
his thinking, not just something characteristic of his social psychology. With these general 
characteristics in mind, let us now proceed with an analysis of Mead’s views on agency and 
objects. 
 
Mead on agency 
In our view, the recent post-processual embrace of agency and practice in archaeology (e.g. 
Dobres 2000; Pauketat 2001) has much to gain from a closer engagement with Mead’s ideas, 
in particular his conception of the psychical and four-phased model of action, the ‘theory of 
the act’. We begin with Mead’s definition of the psychical (2011, chap. 1). As hinted above, 
Mead wishes to avoid the psychological doctrine that suggests that there is a gulf separating 
the ‘objective’ world of external behaviour from the ‘subjective’ states of consciousness. 
Mead’s aim is to be able to account for subjectivity in terms of its role in action. Following 
Dewey’s functionalist analysis, Mead suggests that when action is interrupted so is the world 
of objects surrounding us. In the face of such cases of practical conflict, there is the need to 
reconstruct the problematic objects. When we do so, Mead argues, we are able to see the 
stream of thought as an organic whole. For Mead, then, the natural location of the psychical 
is in those situations where conduct has been interrupted by problems, forcing us to 
reconstruct the whole situation, including ourselves. Mead’s naturalist, pragmatist conception 
of the psychical is closely related to his model of action, to which we now turn.  
Mead’s starting point is relational, not individual. The ‘act’ refers to the relation between 
organism and environment, an: ‘ongoing event that consists of stimulation and response and 
the results of the response’ (Mead 1938: 362). Such an act is Mead’s basic unit of conduct. It 
should be seen as an organic whole, as something going on with a number of phases that can 
be analytically separated, but that cannot be understood except by reference to the whole act. 
As hinted above, Mead conceives of the act as comprehending four stages, the first of which 
is the impulse to action. At the beginning of any act there is a physiological predisposition of 
the organism to respond to a given stimulus. Perception is the next phase. In this second 
stage, the organism perceives either an object or a part of the surrounding environment. The 
third phase of action is manipulation. The organism, after perceiving a distant object, will 
move either towards or away from the object. In most cases, the perceptual phase of the act 
leads to the manipulation of the object, either physically (e.g. an apple) or intellectually (e.g. 
a past event).  As Mead emphasizes in ‘On social consciousness and social science’, a 
manuscript only recently published, manipulation is a very important phase of human 
conduct, for: ‘[t]o see an object as distant or hard is to adjust our process of movements of 
approach and manipulation’ (Mead 2011: 185).  Mead considers perception and manipulation 
to be the intermediate phases of the ongoing act; the fourth and final phase occurs when the 
organism attributes a certain value to the object in question, thereby consummating the act. 
Consummation, therefore, completes the act.  
By conceiving of the ‘social act’ as the bodily organism’s gesture as a physical thing in 
relation to the surrounding environment, Mead wishes to combine a naturalistic explanation 
of human perception with the insight that rational individuals owe their rationality and 
individuality to the social experience in which they take part and of which they are products 
(on Mead’s model of the ontogenesis of human agency, see Martin & Gillespie 2010). Mead’s 
conception of agency, which posits a mutually constitutive relationship between things and 
human beings, is thus an apt supplement to contemporary approaches that emphasize the 
partial agency of things. A case in point is Alfred Gell, whose influential theory of the agency 
of art objects is concerned not with what a thing is, but where it stands in a network of social 
relations (Gell 1998). One of Gell’s central claims is that physical objects can become ‘social 
agents’ as long as there are persons in their vicinity, an idea, as we shall see next, that is 
remarkably consonant with Mead’s concept of object.5  
 
Mead on objects 
Objects, for Mead, are the products of social experience. But Mead’s social pragmatism is no 
mere social constructionism, if by that one means that objects are contingent upon social and 
historical experience (think of ‘gender’ as a social construct), and it certainly does not reduce 
meaning and behaviour to the effects of linguistic or textual practices, as poststructuralists 
tend to do (Wiley 1994). Instead, Mead conceives of objects as being socially constituted in a 
more radical, specific sense. Consider a physical object such as a chair. The chair exists as 
such – as an object with particular characteristics such as weight, resistance, colour, odour, 
etc. – insofar as it gives rise in the individual not only to an organic response but also a 
response to himself as an object calling out this response. What Mead means is that objects 
arise as objects as they become embodied in the responses of the individual manipulating 
them. It is this ‘embodiment of the object’ in the responses of the individual that is ‘the 
essential factor in the emergence of the physical thing’ (1932: 125), as Mead asserts in ‘The 
Physical Thing’, a collection of two different manuscripts published for the first time in 1932, 
as a supplementary essay to The Philosophy of the Present ([1932] 2002). Mead concludes 
this text, one of the most relevant for those interested in his conception of objects, with the 
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observation that one of the conclusions to be drawn from his analysis is: ‘the relatively late 
abstraction of the physical object from the social object and the necessity that the organism 
take the attitude of the other in order to become an object to himself’ ([1932] 2002: 138). 
This conclusion, however, raises as many questions as it answers: How does Mead 
distinguish between physical and social objects? What does he mean by a ‘relatively late 
abstraction’ of physical objects over social ones? And what function does the attitude of self-
objectification perform in his theory? 
To adequately respond to these questions, we need to turn our attention to yet another 
manuscript which has been brought to the attention of the public only recently, ‘On the Self 
and Teleological Behavior’ (Mead 2011: 20-44). A true archaeological find, this manuscript 
emerged from archival work undertaken at the Mead Papers Archive at the University of 
Chicago in the early-2000s (Silva 2011). It offers us a detailed account of Mead’s 
evolutionary, social pragmatist account of the origins, nature and implications of objects – 
including the individual as an object to himself, a ‘self-objectifying’ attitude Mead sees as a 
condition for the emergence of rational self-consciousness, which he analyses from both the 
perspective of the history of the human species (phylogenesis)
 
and from the perspective of the 
process of human individual development (ontogenesis).
  
Mead’s starting point is the relation between the environment and the individual as one of 
‘mutual determination’ (2011: 27). As he points out, a central theme of modern evolutionary 
science has been the influence of the environment upon the individual. What has been 
overlooked, however, is that individuals exercise a definite influence upon the environment. 
It is such a ‘mutual interrelationship of the individuals and their environments’ that accounts 
for the characteristics that define objects. Mead writes that ‘[E]dible, movable, warm, 
injurious, brittle, tough, composite, bending, and resisting objects exist as such because of the 
nature of the individuals that find them within their experience’, concluding that: ‘characters 
are real because of this relation of the individuals and their environments. Without this 
relation these characters would not obtain’ (2011: 27). The same is true of individuals; the 
relationship between the organism and the environment determines the latter as definitely as 
it does the former. By identifying the dialectical nature of this ‘mutual determination’ 
between individuals and the environment, Mead is able to capture its generative, creative 
nature. He writes that, from this dialectical relation arises a: ‘coordination in the structure of 
the organism of the individual which is also new – as new as the object’ (2011: 38). In other 
words, from the tension between individuals and objects arise new individuals as well as new 
objects.  
New individuals arise as the self readjusts to the emergence of a new object. Modern 
individuals, for example, have emerged as new scientific, political and social objects 
gradually came about. Illustrating this thesis with the Copernican revolution, the ‘earlier 
objects were the earth at the center of the world’ whereas the ‘later objects were the sun at the 
center of a system of planets’ (2011: 41) – Mead argues that, from the standpoint of ‘religion, 
politics, education, and art there was a new world and a new society that had not existed 
before’ (2011: 40-41). It would be a mistake, however, to infer from this that Mead is 
suggesting that change occurs only at special historical junctures such as the Renaissance 
period. On the contrary, for Mead, there is constant change as a result of the continuous 
interaction between individuals and objects, as well as between individuals and themselves as 
objects. We discuss these two types of interaction in turn. 
Individuals are in constant interaction with the surrounding environment and the objects that 
compose it. But which objects are these? One possibility, based on the assumption of the 
body-psyche dualism, would be to suggest that some objects are immediately present, 
whereas others exist only in memory or imagination. For example, a tree as a physical thing 
and our childhood memories of a tree. For Mead, however, this distinction is not categorical, 
but one of degree: ‘the actual relation between the organism and the object, though it is no 
longer present, is not in essence different from that lying between the object, which is 
present, and the organism. The difference is only that of degree’ (2011: 25). But what exactly 
is Mead’s understanding of an object? To better appreciate Mead’s highly original concept of 
object one needs to distinguish between his theories of ontology and of meaning (and, more 
generally, of Mead’s symbolic theory of the evolution of mind).6 It is within Mead’s theory of 
ontology that one finds his detailed discussions of what physical objects are, their properties, 
and the functions they perform in social experience. For Mead, however, social objects are an 
entirely different category of phenomena, which requires an altogether distinct analytical 
perspective – a theory of meaning. Social objects, from this perspective, include whatever has 
a common meaning to the participant in the social act. As such, social objects include not 
only physical objects, but also other selves and even complex social institutions and 
organizations, such as language, rights, money, or political parties.
7
  
According to Mead, then, the criterion of something being an object lies in the possibility of 
taking action in respect of it (1938: 430). Mead’s proposed distinction is thus closely related 
to his four-phased theory of the act and is based upon the thesis that we form social objects 
before physical objects; the social consciousness precedes the consciousness of physical 
objects. At first, human organisms interact socially with the surrounding environment and the 
objects of which it is composed. The immediate response of an organism towards an 
inanimate physical object is the same as the response of that organism towards another 
organism. For instance, she loves the pen she usually works with yet hates her mobile phone 
when its battery runs out.  But after a while, individuals abstract from that type of immediate 
response because of what we come to know of such objects. There are, then, two different 
moments when we deal with physical objects; our immediate response is social while our 
later reaction is abstract and rational. What explains the passage from one moment to the 
other is the human hand. In a sense, physical things are the product of the human hand. By 
perceiving and manipulating things we respond to them as physical objects, surpassing the 
initial immediate social response, but prior to consummating the act. As perception and 
manipulation are the intermediate phases of the act, so physical objects (created by the human 
hand) come betwixt and between the beginning of the act and its consummation.  
Let us now consider the interaction of individuals with themselves qua objects. Mead’s thesis 
is straightforward: individuals see themselves as objects insofar as they act as a stimulus upon 
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themselves and insofar they respond to it. Behind this thesis lies the crucial distinction 
between body and self. Whereas bodies can only be objects, selves possess cognitive and 
moral capacity and are therefore capable of being both subjects and objects (Dunn 1997: 
694). Within the dialectic structure of the self, Mead distinguishes between the ‘acting 
individual’ and the ‘individual as an object’ (i.e. the ‘I’ and the ‘me’). As we have seen above, 
the ‘social act’ places the individual in a social relation to himself and so makes a functional 
distinction between the ‘active self’ and the ‘object self’. In conversing with himself, a 
conversation that takes place by means of gestures and predominantly vocal gestures, one 
addresses the self which can be seen and felt, i.e. the self that belongs to the social 
community within which social conduct arises with its gestures. Mead points out that in the 
‘reply, however, the object individual speaks from within, i.e. it is the active individual that 
speaks, but speaks in the role of the object individual’, concluding that this ‘is a role that is 
determined by the social situation’ (2011: 31). This is the reason why Mead claims physical 
objects are a ‘relatively late abstraction’ over social ones. Mead wishes to assert the logical 
and historical priority of social experience – first, there are social objects; only then do 
physical objects arise.  
Furthermore, Mead holds this claim to be valid both from a phylogenetic and an ontogenetic 
point of view. From this latter perspective, the earliest self-conscious conduct of the child is 
that of play, i.e. when the child acts as an other with imaginary companions. It is only when 
these different roles are organized together in the child’s adjustments to the social 
environment that the self arises. Two conditions, therefore, are present in the emergence of 
the self. The first is the tendency to address one’s self in the gestural language of social 
conduct, a tendency that arises with the individual’s finding himself assuming the role of 
another. The second is the tendency to indicate to another individual some object (or 
character of an object) in a cooperative act. ‘Thinking then arises’, Mead concludes (2011: 
32). From the perspective of the human species, Mead suggests that meaning was born when, 
at some point in evolution, the speaking primate learned how to respond to a vocal gesture in 
a similar way to its interlocutor. The consciousness of meaning emerged when primates 
learned how to take the role of the other; with reflective intelligence, primates began to 
perceive and manipulate the objects around them in a radically different way – they could 
now see the ‘inside’ of things, i.e. their abstract properties. Living in an empirical world 
inhabited by physical and social objects, primates become aware of this reflexive capacity via 
an individual other. Colin Renfrew’s influential ‘material engagement theory’ (2004), which 
similarly focuses on how things actively mediate social relations, is a good illustration of the 




We are now in a position to discuss the function performed by this attitude of self-
objectification in Mead’s thinking. Let us begin by considering Mead’s theory of meaning. 
Meaning, according to Mead, has a triadic logical structure made of the gesture of the first 
organism, the responding gesture of the second organism, and the ‘resultant’ of the social act. 
The response of the second organism to the gesture of the first organism is the interpretation 
of that gesture – this response brings out the meaning. Meaning is thus implicit in the 
                                                 
8
 Renfrew, one of the original ‘processualists’, designates his position as ‘cognitive processualism’ to 
acknowledge the importance of cognitive structures, which processual and post-processual archaeology largely 
ignores. Again, we thank our editors for this information. 
structure of the social act; as such, meaning is to be found objectively in social conduct.  In 
Mind, Self, and Society, Mead uses the example of a footprint of a bear to illustrate what he 
has in mind ([1934] 1967: 120-121; see also Silva 2007: 35-36). The footprint is the symbol 
of a bear. When we stumble upon such a footprint we associate that imprinted piece of mud 
with the passage of a bear at a certain prior moment. We might be afraid, not of the footprint 
but of what it means – the presence of a bear. So the footprint is the symbol, the bear is its 
meaning (i.e., the ‘resultant’ of the social act), and to be able to identify such a symbol as 
leading to such a meaning is the distinctive feature of human intelligence. Individuals thus 
create symbols to indicate, to themselves as well as to other members of the group, the 
implications of a certain object or gesture (see also Preucel 2006, whose work on semiotics 
draws on the pragmatism of Peirce). In a sense, then, symbolization creates objects. The piece 
of mud only becomes a ‘footprint’ when an individual looks at it and interprets it as meaning 
‘bear’. Such an object could not have existed if it were not for the social context in which that 
process of symbolization occurs. There are at least two important implications that one can 
draw from Mead’s theory of symbolization. Firstly, as Mead puts it, language ‘makes possible 
the existence of the appearance of that situation or object, for it is a part of the mechanism 
whereby that situation or object is created’ ([1934] 1967: 78). Secondly, the meaning of a 
certain object or gesture exists prior to the consciousness of meaning. It exists in the 
behavioural structure that relates individuals to the environment in which they live. Human 
conduct structures this relation so that, according to Mead, meaning is neither linguistically 
constituted, nor is it a given datum. Again, we can see here the extent to which Mead’s 
pragmatism is in tune with current approaches in archaeology that posit a greater emphasis on 
issues of meaning, the individual, culture and history. Even though Mead would never 
subscribe to a position that would reduce physical things to text, thereby denying their 
materiality, we believe that his notion of object and theory of meaning can potentially be of 
great interest for post-positivist archaeologists. A case in point is the British archaeologist Ian 
Hodder, who argues that things are to be regarded as text, and that artefacts are silent only 
when they are ‘out of their texts’, i.e. the network of relations between the artefact, its locus 
of discovery, and other artefacts and features that constitute the field within which meaning 
can be read (Hodder 1984, 1986; see also Hodder 1989, Tilley 1991).
9
 This notion of 
meaning as an emergent from a symbolically saturated field of relations between agents and 
objects, we sustain, is very much in line with Mead’s thinking. 
Mead’s conception of society and social cooperation cannot be understood without reference 
to significant symbols. Complex, large-scale social life is possible only because human 
beings developed significant language. Mead’s principle of social integration rests upon the 
human ability to symbolize, so that understanding a significant language is of first 
importance.  This sharing of the responses of others is what distinguishes the unconscious 
conversation of gestures from conscious communication. Self-stimulation is barely present in 
the former, while it plays a decisive role in the latter. Anticipating recent work in the 
neurosciences that associates the emergence of language with this ‘self-objectifying’ 
                                                 
9
 This said, in his more recent work Hodder has moved away from ‘things as text’ to stress the distinctiveness of 
things. See Hodder (2012). 
attitude,
10
 Mead argues that this is a distinctive feature of the human self. Indeed, Mead goes 
as far as to suggest that this ‘self-objectifying’ attitude is a condition of human rationality – 
one is rational to the extent to which one is able to take an impersonal, objective attitude 
towards oneself. The centrality of this self-objectifying attitude and, indeed, of the concept of 
‘object’ more generally to Mead’s system of thinking, should be clear by now. Together with 
its evolutionary outlook, they are key contributions to contemporary archaeologies interested 
in issues of meaning and agency. Their relative neglect by archaeologists can only be 
explained, we believe, by the unfortunate history of the reception of Mead’s ideas within the 
humanities and the social sciences. In this chapter, we have suggested one way of correcting 
this situation. Our proposed solution took the form of a critical re-examination of the history 
of the reception of Mead’s ideas. This exercise was undertaken within the pragmatic spirit 
that contemporary archaeology seems increasingly to be adopting (Baert 2005), and aimed at 
recovering a forgotten contribution from the past, as well as gaining critical distance from our 
beliefs. Quentin Skinner, one of the senior members of the so-called ‘Cambridge school’, 
speaks of these same aims in the language of archaeology (Lane 2012: 73-74). Critical 
distance from our beliefs, Skinner tell us, is gained as the result of ‘excavations’ practiced by 
historians or ethnographers, whereas the ‘fruit’ of intellectual history can be described as a 
‘buried treasure’ (2002: 126). This choice of language by Skinner, for whom an intellectual 
historian is a ‘kind of archaeologist’ (1998: 112), is a suggestive indication that the 
connections between intellectual history, pragmatism, and archaeology run deep. 
 
Concluding comments 
In this paper we discussed classical pragmatism, notably G.H. Mead’s version, and its 
possible significance for archaeology and archaeological theory. We showed first that Mead’s 
evolutionary and naturalist perspective was not simply a study of how cultural systems adapt 
to their environments. On the contrary, Mead actively pursued what could be called a post-
naturalist agenda, in the sense of a concern with the meanings people attribute to their worlds 
(Baert 2005). This, in turn, led us to consider Mead’s understanding of agency and his 
original conception of objects. As we have suggested, there are numerous connections 
between Mead’s symbolic account of the material world and how current, post-processual 
archaeologists are approaching artefacts and physical objects. From Gell’s theory of art 
objects as social agents and Renfrew’s material engagement theory to Hodder’s relational 
understanding of the meaning of artefacts and the developing dialogue between post-
processual and evolutionary archaeologies (Cochrane & Gardner 2011, esp. Introduction), we 
have tried to identify significant intersections between G.H. Mead's work and current 
archaeological theory that has adopted a pragmatic spirit .  
 
                                                 
10 We refer to the suggestion by evolutionary psychologists that mirror neurons, i.e. neurons that fire both when 
an animal acts and when the animal observes the same action performed by another, are behind the emergence 
of language (e.g. Ramachandran 2010). 
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